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“You may shoot me with your words, you may cut me with
your eyes, you may kill me with your hatefulness, but still, like
air, I’ll rise.”
— Maya Angelou1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the abstract, speech may have much intrinsic value. It can facilitate
human interaction, organization, education, autonomy, self-actualization,
tolerance and democratic governance.2 Certain speech in certain contexts,
however, can be quite deleterious—promoting division, ignorance, retarded
growth, hatred, self-loathing, violence and anti-democratic governance.3
Within the crucible of atrocity, speech may be similarly Janus-faced. Its
power to prevent mass violence is indubitable.4 But its capacity for enabling
mass violence is similarly unquestionable.5 So the issue arises: when and
how may speech work for good or ill in relation to patterns of atrocity? This
Article will grapple with that question.
And the answer depends on both timing and speech quality. More
specifically, the relationship between speech and atrocity might be analyzed
within a two-axis matrix. The first axis relates to chronology and divides
into “process” (referring to the cycle of atrocity) and “pre-process” (or preatrocity) phases. The “pre-process” phase indicates a potential target group
is successfully integrated into the social fabric and not subjected to untoward
1
Maya Angelou, Still I Rise, AMERICAN POEMS (June 4, 2004), http://www.americanp
oems.com/poets/Maya_Angelou/13470.
2
See Deana Pollard Sacks, Snyder v. Phelps, The Supreme Court’s Speech-Tort
Jurisprudence, and Normative Considerations, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 193, 199 (2010)
(arguing that, like tort law, “[f]reedom of speech furthers the American ideals of an open and
honest democratic process, discovery of the truth, self-actualization, and avoidance of
injustice and furtherance of tolerance in a pluralistic society”).
3
See Katharine Gelber, Reconceptualizing Counterspeech in Hate Speech Policy, in THE
CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION AND RESPONSES 198, 211
(Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012) (“Speech is able both to enhance the development
of our capabilities and, under the right circumstances, to imperil the development of
capabilities.”).
4
See, e.g., Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi., Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U.S. 287, 296 (1941) (suggesting that speech could prevent violence in the context of a
labor dispute).
5
See, e.g., Rachel Weintraub-Reiter, Note, Hate Speech Over the Internet: A Traditional
Constitutional Analysis or a New Cyber Constitution?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 170 (1998)
(noting that hate speech may incite others to violence).
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degrees of prejudice or discrimination. The “process” (or mass atrocity
cycle) phase consists of three critical junctures: (1) identification; (2) action;
and (3) execution. The second axis is qualitative and entails classifying
speech as both “salutary” and “inimical.” Returning to the chronology axis,
during the pre-process phase, the focus must be on disseminating salutary
speech. Such speech can go a long way toward preventing prejudice,
discrimination and the formation of extremist groups.6
Dissemination can be achieved through various means, including
fostering education with an emphasis on teaching pluralistic values,
establishing pro-tolerance non-governmental organizations active in
engaging with the citizenry, and safeguarding free access to channels of
public communication.7 During the “identification” stage—when prejudice
and discrimination are on the rise—promoting salutary speech may still play
an important role in preventing atrocity.8 The question during this stage
becomes whether salutary speech is still capable of negating inimical
speech.9 During the “action” stage—when pre-atrocity persecutory measures
are being enacted—negating inimical speech may no longer be possible.10
And during the “execution” stage, when speech is in the service of ongoing
violence or directed toward inciting it, the primary goal becomes preventing
inimical speech through legal action—most realistically, through externally
imposed punishment.11 Such punishment may have a significant deterrent
effect and help combat the culture of impunity.12
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part II will consider the nature
and parameters of the concept of “speech” and its classification into
“salutary,” “neutral,” and “inimical.” It will further break down the concepts
of salutary and inimical speech into sub-categories and demonstrate that
inimical speech can be classified along a spectrum that includes more
innocuous variations of communication that are borderline “neutral” and
more direct communications that either hint at or actually constitute calls for
exclusion, disenfranchisement, or violence.
6

See Sacks, supra note 2, at 199.
See Nicole Simmons et al., HIV/AIDS in the Horn of Africa, in PUBLIC HEALTH ASPECTS OF
HIV/AIDS IN LOW AND MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES (David D. Celentano & Chris Beyrer eds.,
2008) (analyzing speech-focused public awareness campaigns in the context of eradicating
HIV/AIDS).
8
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
9
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
10
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
11
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
12
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
7
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Part III will examine the chronological axis. It will sketch out a series of
steps that may lead to mass atrocity and generally break down into the “preprocess” and “process” stages. As before, it will propose sub-categories—
this time within the process phase. Those sub-categories will consist of the
“identification,” “action,” and “execution” phases.
Finally, Part IV will examine the interaction between the two axes. It will
demonstrate that salutary speech will always be the proper tonic for an
incipient tide of discrimination against a victim group in the pre-process
stage. It will also show that societies with more developed democratic
institutions may rely on salutary speech to reverse the persecutory effects of
the early process stage. Nevertheless, even in democratically advanced
societies hijacked by hate-mongering strongmen, there comes a juncture
when a persecutory campaign, and speech used in support of it, reach critical
mass. At that point, when channels of communication are monopolized by
the government and inimical speech goes largely unanswered, legal action is
in order. In all likelihood, punishment in the form of prosecutions on
charges of instigation, persecution, or incitement will be the most effective
remedy for inimical speech. And given that the sitting government is
implicated in the atrocities, barring regime change, such punishment will
likely be externally imposed. Nevertheless, punishment in the form of
criminal prosecutions respecting due process will provide deterrence and
expressive condemnation, thereby making significant inroads against the
culture of impunity.
II. CATEGORIES OF SPEECH
A. Neutral Speech
Most speech in everyday life does not implicate pernicious forms of
target-group hatred, discrimination, persecution, exclusion, or violence.
Thus, it may be categorized as “neutral.”13 With respect to non-neutral
speech, this Article will classify it as either “salutary” or “inimical.”14 These
two speech rubrics will be the focus of this Article’s analysis.

13

Similarly, speech uttered in private, even if discriminatory, must be classified as neutral
given that its slight or non-existent impact on the target group is counterbalanced by privacy
and free expression concerns.
14
This bifurcation is often described as the difference between “good speech” and “bad
speech.” See Arielle D. Kane, Note, Sticks and Stones: How Words Can Hurt, 43 B.C. L.
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B. Salutary Speech
Salutary speech is rather straightforward. This Article posits that it may
be “focused” or “non-focused.” Regarding the latter, any form of expression
that generally promotes policies of tolerance, pluralism, or inclusion vis-à-vis
potential target groups, or casts discrimination or persecution against them in
a negative light, should qualify.15 In other words, it is salutary speech that is
not specifically offered in response to inimical speech.16
“Focused” salutary speech, on the other hand, is uttered explicitly in
response to inimical speech. Put another way, if discriminatory, persecutory,
or exclusionary statements are made against a target group, this category of
speech represents a form of “counter-speech” meant to expose as
problematic and thereby marginalize the statements.17
C. Inimical Speech
This Article posits that “inimical” speech can be categorized as follows:
(1) general statements; (2) harassment; and (3) incitement. Each of these
shall be treated in turn.
1. General Statements
Inimical speech consists of three major points along a spectrum. On one
end, one would find its mildest forms—general statements casting aspersions
on a target group.18 In this more innocuous form, the speech could perhaps
be considered borderline “neutral.” For example, statements suggesting a
group makes less of a contribution to the health of a country’s economy than
other groups in the country (e.g., “The Tutsis engage in far less research and
development activity than the Hutus”).
REV. 159, 190 (2001) (alluding to the notion that “good speech” is thought to combat “bad
speech” in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence).
15
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “salutary” as “producing a
wholesome, corrective, or ultimately beneficial effect.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2006 (1993).
16
“Focus” is defined as “a central point . . . a center of activity or attraction or one drawing
the greatest attention and interest . . . a point of concentration.” Id. at 881. By implication,
“non-focused” refers to something that is not a point of concentration.
17
See Gelber, supra note 3, at 206.
18
See PHYLLIS B. GERSTENFELD, HATE CRIMES: CAUSES, CONTROLS AND CONTROVERSIES
35 (2010).
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Other statements within this rubric can be more easily classified as
inimical. For example, such statements could consist of the republication of
explicitly negative racial, ethnic, or religious stereotypes. This may be
referred to as “group libel,” which entails attacking or defaming a group that
suffers from social prejudice and creating a general climate more receptive to
animosity toward and violence against the group.19 These are general
statements not necessarily directed at any person in particular. Such
statements may include efforts to ascribe to the group overall negative
qualities such as greed, laziness, poor hygiene, criminal propensity, and
mendacity. More seriously, they could comprise statements dehumanizing
the victim group through techniques of “verminization” (equating the group
with parasitic, pestilent sub-human creatures such as lice or locusts),
“pathologization” (analogizing the group with disease), and “demonization”
(ascribing to the group satanic or other comparable evil qualities).20
2. Harassment
Moving further along toward the other end of the spectrum, in the middle,
statements voiced directly at the victims can be categorized as
“harassment.”21 Such statements would be addressed to the collective group
(e.g., “You do not belong here” or “You are parasites”) or to particular
individuals (e.g., “You filthy residents of the Biryogo are making the rest of
society dirty and disease-infested. You are destroying our country.”).22
19

See Kent Greenfield, Group Libel Laws, in DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 67
(Stanley I. Kutler ed., 3d ed. 2003).
20
See Gregory S. Gordon, Music and Genocide: Harmonizing Coherence, Freedom and
Nonviolence in Incitement Law, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 607, 639–41 (2010). The cited
passage in this Article refers to dehumanization as a method of incitement. This is a matter of
degree. Less virulent forms of dehumanization may not amount to calls for action and can
therefore be categorized as general hate speech. The language must be parsed on a case-bycase basis to determine the proper category.
21
See NORMAN E. BOWIE & ROBERT L. SIMON, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE POLITICAL ORDER:
AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 136 (1998) (describing speech at
specifically targeted individuals as a form of harassment).
22
In the United States, the most speech-protective country in the world, such speech might
be deemed “fighting words” not deserving of First Amendment protection. See, e.g.,
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255–57 (1952) (“ ‘There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problems. These include . . . the insulting or ‘fighting’
words . . . it has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”).
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3. Incitement
The final point in this direction along the spectrum entails advocacy
directed toward third persons, i.e., “incitement.”23 Such messages are
designed to provoke action vis-à-vis the victim group.24 This kind of
incitement bifurcates into two forms: (1) incitement toward non-violent
action; and (2) incitement toward violent action.25 Regarding the former, one
can discern three general relevant non-violence categories: (1) incitement to
hatred; (2) incitement to discrimination; and (3) incitement to persecution.26
Incitement to hatred urges the majority group to develop general feelings
of animosity toward the victim group.27 It is similar to group libel but takes a
more active tone in encouraging the majority group to despise the minority.
For example, the Rwandan pop singer Simon Bikindi’s pre-Rwandan
genocide song Njyewe nanga Abahutu (“I Hate the Hutu”) actively
encouraged extremist Hutus to develop feelings of contempt for moderate
Hutus who were supporting Tutsis in the period leading up to the genocide
(both moderate Hutus and Tutsis were victim groups during this time).
Incitement to discrimination urges the majority group to mistreat the victim
group in particular non-violent ways. It could be a call to the majority group
to refuse medical treatment or service in restaurants or discourage marriage
with members of the victim group. For example, a Nazi pamphlet distributed

Similarly, advocating illegal conduct to third-parties in the United States will not be protected
if it seeks “imminent” action and is reasonably likely to provoke such action imminently. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that speech advocating lawless
action is protected unless it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action”). Thus, looking at the analogy to domestic laws, it is
no surprise that incitement, next along the spectrum after harassment, would also be
considered more serious than general hate speech. Continuing with the United States as a
point of reference, of these types of speech, only general hate speech would presumably find
absolute protection under the First Amendment.
23
See Ian Leigh, Homophobic Speech, Equality Denial, and Religious Expression, in
EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 375, 379 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. (discussing the breakdown of incitement in the context of the Netherlands Criminal
Code).
27
See Gregory S. Gordon, Hate Speech and Persecution: A Contextual Approach, 46
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 303, 343–44 (2013); see also Wibke Timmerman, The Relationship
between Hate Propaganda and Incitement to Genocide: A New Trend in International Law
toward Criminalization of Hate Propaganda?, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 257, 276 (2005).
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to German teenagers warned them not to “mix” with Jewish people or marry
them for fear of race “defilement.”28
Incitement to persecution is incitement to discrimination on a broader and
more systematic scale.29 This is advocacy to exclude the victim group from
participation in society and enjoyment of civil rights in a comprehensive
way.30 In pre-genocide Rwanda, for example, Hassan Ngeze published the
infamous Ten Commandments of the Hutu in a 1990 issue of Kangura.31
One commentator has described this document as an appeal to “Hutus to
separate themselves from the Tutsis.”32 In fact, it was a call for
comprehensive exclusion of Tutsis from society: (1) Hutu males must not
have close personal or work relations with Tutsi women; (2) Hutu women
are superior to Tutsi women; (3) Hutu women must fraternize only with Hutu
men; (4) Tutsis are dishonest and no Hutus should conduct business with
them; (5) all high-level positions in society should be occupied by Hutus
only; (6) the education sector should be majority Hutu; (7) the military must
be exclusively Hutu; (8) the Hutus should stop having mercy on the Tutsis;
(9) all Hutus must have unity and solidarity; and (10) the ideology of the
1959 and 1961 revolution (when many Tutsis were disenfranchised, forced to
leave Rwanda or massacred) must be taught to Hutus at all levels.33
The other major form of incitement is to violence. There are two
varieties—explicit and non-explicit.34 Since incitement to violence is often
effectuated via code, non-explicit calls are quite common.35 William
Schabas has observed that those who incite to mass atrocity “speak in
euphemisms.”36
Such non-explicit methods can be myriad in form and include:
28
You and Your People, GERMAN PROPAGANDA ARCHIVE, http://www.calvin.edu/academic/
cas/gpa/du.htm (last visited July 28, 2012).
29
See David L. Neressian, Comparative Approaches to Punishing Hate: The Intersection of
Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 221, 263 (2007) (describing
persecution as discrimination on a widespread or systematic basis).
30
Id.
31
The Verdict: Summary Judgment from the Media Trial, in THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA
GENOCIDE 279–81 (Allan Thompson ed., 2007).
32
THE PATH TO GENOCIDE (2005), available at http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/
rwanda/text-images/Panel%20Set%202%20Low%20Res.pdf.
33
See SAMUEL TOTTEN ET AL., DICTIONARY OF GENOCIDE: A-L 200 (2008).
34
See Gordon, supra note 20, at 638–39 (discussing the difference between explicitly
calling for violence and the more indirect method of predicting violence).
35
Id. at 638–44.
36
William A. Schabas, Mugesera v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 529, 530 (1999) (speaking of incitement to genocide).
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(1) predictions of destruction (in the Media Case Trial
Chamber Judgment, for instance, certain RTLM emissions that
predicted liquidation of the Tutsis were among those
broadcasts deemed to constitute incitement);37
(2) so-called “accusation in a mirror” (which consists of
imputing to the victim the intention of committing the same
crimes that the actual perpetrator is committing, as in Leon
Mugesera’s November 1992 speech: “These people called
Inyenzis are now on their way to attack us . . . they only want
to exterminate us.”);38
(3) euphemisms and metaphors (in the Rwandan genocide, for
instance, “go to work,” a common mass slaughter directive,
meant “kill Tutsis”);39
(4) justification during contemporaneous violence (this
amounts to describing atrocity already taking place in a manner
that convinces the audience its violence is morally justified—
Nazi leaders, for example, described to potentially complicit
Germans the “humaneness” of their massacres, torture, death
marches, slavery, and other atrocities);40
(5) condoning and congratulating past violence (RTLM
announcers, such as Georges Ruggiu, would congratulate the
“valiant combatants” who engaged in a “battle” against Tutsi
civilians;41

37

Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 405 (Dec. 3, 2003)
(“Thus when day breaks, when that day comes, we will be heading for a brighter future, for
the day when we will be able to say ‘There isn’t a single Inyenzi left in the country.”).
38
Mugesera v. Canada, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100 (Can.), ¶ 18; see also Gordon, supra note 20,
at 641–42; Kenneth L. Marcus, Accusation in a Mirror, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 357, 359 (2012).
39
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 44(iv)
(June 1, 2000); see also Gordon, supra note 20, at 642.
40
See 3 RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 1010 (1961); Gordon,
supra note 20, at 642.
41
Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, ¶ 44(v); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR 96-14T, ¶ 142, Judgment and Sentence (May 16, 2003); see also Gordon, supra note 20, at 642–43.
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(6) asking questions about violence (Simon Bikindi asked Hutu
militia over a truck loudspeaker “[h]ave you killed the Tutsis
here”? and he further asked whether they had killed the
“snakes.”);42 and
(7) more virulent forms of verminization, pathologization, and
demonization (RTLM announcer Georges Ruggiu admitted that
the word Inyenzi, as used in the socio-political context of the
time of the Rwandan genocide, came to designate the Tutsis as
“persons to be killed.”).43
Of course, the most serious form of incitement consists of explicit calls
for violence. These are relatively rare in mass atrocity cases but certainly the
most chilling and evocative of the possible horrors surrounding hate
speech.44 A prominent example is Kantano Habimana’s June 4, 1994,
broadcast in which he asked listeners to exterminate the “Inkotanyi,” or
Tutsis, who would be known by height and physical appearance.45
Habimana then added: “Just look at his small nose and then break it.”46
Another disturbing example comes from Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, who urged Israel’s destruction when he told the Iranian people
in October 2005 that Israel “must be wiped off the map.”47

42
Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment, ¶ 423 (Dec. 2, 2008); see also
Gordon, supra note 20, at 643.
43
Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, ¶ 44(iii); see also Gordon, supra note 20, at 639–44.
44
It should be noted that general hate speech not calling for violence can be transformed
into incitement when closely anchored to speech calling for violence. See Marcus, supra note
38, at 391 n.200.
45
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 396 (Dec. 3, 2003).
46
Id.
47
See Nazila Fathi, Iran’s New President Says Israel Must Be ‘Wiped Off the Map,’ N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at A8. Certain commentators have disputed that this constitutes direct
and public incitement to commit genocide. See, e.g., Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or
Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 490–91 (2008)
(“Ahmadinejad’s speech was reprehensible and perhaps even dangerous, but did not constitute
incitement to genocide, in my view.”). But given Iran’s support of terrorist attacks against
Israel, it may have constituted CAH-persecution. See, e.g., Gregory S. Gordon, From
Incitement to Indictment? Prosecuting Iran’s President for Advocating Israel’s Destruction
and Piecing Together Incitement Law’s Emerging Analytical Framework, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 853, 880–82 (2008) (analyzing whether this constitutes CAH-persecution).
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FIG. 1 – CATEGORIES OF SPEECH

III. CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
Assessing how to deal with the various categories of speech, it is
submitted, depends entirely on the timing and context of the speech’s
utterance. As alluded to above, this Article posits that timing and context
may be divided into two phases—“pre-process” and “process.”48 To the
extent the “process” phase deals with atrocity, during which salutary speech
may be of limited value, the pre-process phase is centered exclusively on the
beneficial effects of salutary speech.49
A. The Pre-Process Phase
But what are the nature and parameters of the “pre-process” phase? In
general, it may be characterized as a period predominantly nondiscriminatory or non-persecutory for any potential target group.50 In other
48

See discussion supra Part I.
See discussion supra Part I.
50
See Natalie Vladi, Race, Ethnicity, and Workplace Diversity, in ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOUR IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 295, 315–16 (Albert J. Mills et al. eds., 2007) (analyzing
positive treatment of minorities in the non-persecutory environment of Canada).
49

2014]

SPEECH ALONG THE ATROCITY SPECTRUM

437

words, in general, the target group is permitted meaningfully to participate in
the civic, social, cultural, and economic life of the nation and be protected by
its laws.51
In such a scenario, under a more or less functional equal protection legal
regime, the group’s members are able to hold and espouse their political,
social, and religious beliefs; engage in commercial activity, both as providers
and consumers; seek employment and employment benefits in all sectors of
the economy; have access to decent educational opportunities, housing, and
health care; vote for, seek and hold public office; and enjoy the protections
of due process and the fundamental freedoms and rights recognized by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.52 Such societies tend to have a
developed civil society sector; rule of law; a separation between civilian and
military functions; and open access to communication media in terms of a
non-monopolized, vigorous press and citizen access to various public
speaking fora.53
Of course, there may be gradations in this scenario. Certain societies, for
instance, possess various degrees of equal protection and/or due process
deficits.54 And groups in those communities may be victimized in a variety
of ways, including being subjected to inimical speech.55 Such a situation
might be an ideal breeding ground for extremist groups pursuing a
discriminatory, persecutory, or exclusionary agenda vis-à-vis certain

51

Id.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 218 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/; see also
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available
at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.
ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx.
53
See Lara Appicciafuoco, The Promotion of the Rule of Law in the Western Balkans: The
European Union’s Role, 11 GERMAN L.J. 741, 752 n.43 (2010) (noting that a successful
democratic rule of law regime includes “the separation of powers, particularly the
independence of the judiciary and the legislature from the executive; pluralism [including] the
independence of media, a free press, and respect for freedom of association and assembly;
good governance, particularly by supporting administrative accountability and the prevention
[of] and fight against corruption; participation of people in civil society and economic life and
politics; and separation among civilian and military functions.”).
54
See Introduction, in IDENTITIES IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION AND MULTICULTURALISM 1,
3 (Judit Bokser de Liwerant ed., 2008) (suggesting that societies may offer different
frameworks related to tolerance towards ethnic minorities).
55
Id.
52
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groups.56 But as long as these groups still have basic access to legal redress
and open channels of communication, salutary speech should serve as an
effective counter to the inimical speech proffered by extremist groups or
other hate-mongering individuals.57
Nevertheless, in certain societies, the equal protection and/or due process
degradation may be more severe.58 At some point, verbal attacks on the
target group may not be neutralized by salutary ripostes.59 In many cases,
determining when this takes place may be quite challenging because
societies in violent transition may often linger in a twilight zone between
protection and non-protection for the target group. Still, as attacks on the
group pick up and its civil liberties are more and more restricted, a society
will enter the early stages of the “process” phase. And the cycle leading to
the occurrence of mass atrocity will have begun.
B. The Process Phase
Mass atrocity does not typically happen overnight—it usually takes time
for the necessary groundwork to be laid.60 And thus it tends to consist of
different stages that lead to the eventual orgy of violence. This Article posits
that these stages form a “process” that can be subdivided as follows:
(1) identification; (2) action; and (3) execution.
This cyclical triad is in part derived from Professor Gregory Stanton’s
genocide prediction/prognosis model titled “The 8 Stages of Genocide.”61
According to Stanton’s model, the genocidal process unfolds as follows:
(1) classification (use of categories to distinguish those discriminating and
those discriminated against (target group) into “us and them” by ethnicity,
56

See Katerina Dalacoura, Islamic Terrorism and the Middle East Democratic Deficit:
Political Exclusion, Repression, and Causes of Extremism, DEMOCRATISATION 13, no. 3:508–25.
57
See Paula Franzese et al., Censorship on the Internet: Do Obscene or Pornographic
Materials Have A Protected Status?, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279, 323
(1995) (noting that good speech is effective in countering bad speech as long as there is
sufficient time for the good speech to have its effect).
58
See MOHAMED NIMER, THE NORTH AMERICAN MUSLIM RESOURCE GUIDE: MUSLIM
COMMUNITY LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 17 (2002) (pointing out, for example,
that Muslim minorities have been denied equal treatment across Europe, Asia, and Africa).
59
Id. (going on to observe that certain minority groups have eventually been subjected to
genocide or otherwise massive destruction of life and property).
60
See Gregory H. Stanton, The 8 Stages of Genocide, GENOCIDE WATCH, http://www.genocid
ewatch.org/aboutgenocide/8stagesofgenocide.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2012) (observing that
genocide takes place over time in a series of stages).
61
Id.
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race, religion, or nationality—e.g., German and Jew, Hutu and Tutsi);
(2) symbolization (assigning symbols to the classification—i.e., associating
with or foisting upon a target group certain colors or apparel, such as the
golden Star of David patch for Jews in Nazi Germany or the blue scarf for
Eastern Zone residents in Khmer Rouge Cambodia); (3) dehumanization
(equating the target group with animals, vermin, insects or diseases);
(4) organization (e.g., establishing militia and drawing up lists);
(5) polarization (e.g., broadcasting hate propaganda or forbidding social,
civic or economic interaction with the target group); (6) preparation (the
target group is segregated, its property expropriated and death lists are drawn
up); (7) extermination (the actual killing of the dehumanized victims begins);
and (8) denial (it always follows a genocide and is a signal that additional
killings of the victim group are intended).62
For purposes of speech analysis, these eight stages can be agglomerated into
the identification, action, and execution groupings alluded to above.
“Identification” would include “classification,” “symbolization,” and
“dehumanization.”
“Action” would comprehend “polarization” and
“preparation.” And “execution” would consist of “extermination” and “denial.”
FIG. 2 – CHRONOLOGY OF ATROCITY

IV. COMBINING SPEECH AND CHRONOLOGY
The ultimate goal of this Article is to examine how the two axes of speech
and chronology might interact. To do that, it is helpful to divide the speech
analysis along the chronological axis in terms of “pre-process” and
“process.”
62

Id.
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A. Speech in the Pre-Process Phase
As demonstrated above, the “pre-process” phase entails the target group’s
experiencing minimal amounts of discrimination.63 Nevertheless, this can be
a period of mounting inter-ethnic, racial, or religious tension.64 In fact, it is
most likely during the pre-process phase that extremist groups are formed,
leading to prejudice and discrimination fanned through incipient inimical
speech, when racist slogans are coined and at least preliminarily circulated.65
Significantly, this is when salutary speech is at its most potent.66
1. Non-Focused Salutary Speech
In societies that are proactive, “non-focused” salutary speech can be
strategically disseminated before extremist groups achieve critical mass in
terms of stoking prejudice and discrimination.67 This may be achieved
through various means. One of the most important actors in this regard is
civil society.
Civil society has been defined as “a public space between the state, the
market and the ordinary household in which people can debate and tackle
action.”68 Robert Pekkanen defines civil society as the “organized, non-state,
nonmarket sector.”69 That could include any voluntary collective activity in
which people combine to achieve change on a particular issue—but not
political parties, even though civil society has a political dimension.70 By
this definition, civil society includes entities such as charities, neighborhood
self-help groups, social activity clubs, civic improvement campaigns, civil
rights defenders, and non-governmental organizations.71
These actors can distribute “non-focused” salutary speech in a multitude
of ways: public discussion forums, informational pamphlets, social media
63

See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
65
See ALEX ALVAREZ, GOVERNMENTS, CITIZENS, AND GENOCIDE: A COMPARATIVE AND
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 83 (2001) (describing this phenomenon within the context of
the Rwandan genocide).
66
Id. (suggesting, by implication, that this would be the case).
67
See discussion supra Part II.B.
68
What Is Civil Society, BBC WORLD SERVICE (July 5, 2001), http://www.bbc.co.uk/world
service/people/highlights/010705_civil.shtml.
69
ROBERT PEKKANEN, JAPAN’S DUAL CIVIL SOCIETY: MEMBERS WITHOUT ADVOCATES 3
(2006).
70
What Is Civil Society, supra note 68.
71
Id.
64
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blasts, minority-majority group joint exercises (such as civic works
projects—e.g., a neighborhood clean-up campaign, jointly undertaken),
citizen-new immigrant coffee klatches, school house presentations, and
tolerance awareness drives.72
Educational institutions can also play a decisive role in this regard.73
School curricula can be designed to promote pluralistic values and
tolerance.74 This can be achieved consciously and effectively through, inter
alia, course selection and design, individual lesson plan development,
reading materials, bringing in outside speakers, organizing special events and
commemorative days, and assigning relevant extra credit extra-curricular
activities.75
Governments and international organizations can also help by
establishing institutions to spread a positive message about tolerance and
integration.76 This can include directly establishing government agencies or
setting up funding mechanisms for civil society groups and educational
institutions.77 Governments can also work to ensure pluralistic political
participation and exercise of free speech and press rights.78
Related to this, the press can also make a valuable contribution.79
Providing coverage with respect to the above activities and providing space
for commentary and op-eds circulating ideas for promoting tolerance,
diversity and non-discrimination constitutes another important piece of the
mosaic of pre-process, non-focused salutary speech.80
72
See JOSEPH M. BESSETTE ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: DELIBERATION,
DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP 829 (2012) (providing some examples).
73
See Ana Carolina Bonifacio et al., Mainstreaming Climate Change Through School
Education: Perspectives and Challenges, in COMMUNITY, ENVIRONMENT, AND DISASTER RISK
MANAGEMENT 147 (Rajib Shaw et al. eds., 2010) (quoting the UN International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction: “Schools are the best venues for forging durable collective values;
therefore they are suitable for building a culture of prevention.”).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
See, e.g., 2000 U.N.Y.B. 54, U.N. Sales No. E.02/I.1 (noting that the UN promotes
tolerance and respect for diversity); JOHN B. RONEY, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF THE
NETHERLANDS 88 (2009) (“The early modern Dutch Republic practiced tolerance . . . the
Dutch are at the forefront of social engineering, especially regarding persistent social
problems.”).
77
See RONEY, supra note 76, at 88.
78
Id.
79
See EUGENIA SIAPERA, CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL MEDIA: THE MEDIATION OF
DIFFERENCE 63 (2010) (“Scientifically, the studies showed that the relationship between media
and cultural diversity was one in which the former played a determining role.”).
80
Id.
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2. Focused Salutary Speech
During this phase, and perhaps more so during its end-stages, focused
salutary speech takes on greater significance.81 It is unrealistic to think that,
even in the most optimal circumstances of the pre-process period, where
non-focused salutary speech is thriving, inimical speech will be entirely
absent.82 And thus, when it does rear its ugly head, focused salutary speech
is an essential component of preserving a pre-process state of affairs.83
As noted previously, focused salutary speech serves as a direct and
explicit counter to inimical speech. And its value is one of the fundamental
underpinnings of the free-speech-oriented metaphor of the “marketplace of
ideas,” which has particular resonance in the United States, routinely
Why do
considered the world’s most speech-protective country.84
Americans so vigorously protect freedom of expression?
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that the
government may “make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press.”85 The United States, unlike perhaps any other nation, has relied
on freedom of expression, as opposed to suppression, to expose inimical
ideas, marginalize them, and thereby promote and safeguard democracy. In
1919, Justice Holmes issued his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States in
which he introduced the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor to encapsulate the
U.S. concept of freedom of speech.86 In the marketplace metaphor, ideas
compete against one another for acceptance—with the underlying faith that
truth will prevail in such an open encounter. Borrowing from John Milton’s
“Areopagitica” (1644) and John Stuart Mill’s “On Liberty” (1859), Holmes
wrote in his Abrams dissent:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas--that the
81

See discussion supra Part II.B.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
83
See discussion supra Part II.B.
84
See Roza Pati, Rights and Their Limits: The Constitution for Europe in International and
Comparative Legal Perspective, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 223, 232 n.39 (2005) (noting the
United States has the most speech-protective theory of the limits on freedom of expression
encountered not only in domestic constitutional systems, but also internationally).
85
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
86
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
82
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best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market . . . . That at any rate
is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life
is an experiment.87
Implicit in this notion of the “free trade in ideas” is that focused salutary
speech will challenge inimical speech head on and triumph in the
encounter.88 But what if the delivery systems for focused salutary speech
appear less responsive, or worse, outright atrophied? That might signal the
pre-process phase is coming to an end. Or perhaps it means the “process”
has begun.
B. Speech in the Process Phase
As mentioned previously, the “process” phase consists of three stages—
identification, action, and execution.
1. The Identification Stage
The identification stage, which breaks down into the “classification,”
“symbolization,” and “dehumanization” segments, may not be completely
immune to the positive effects of salutary speech.89 This is the twilight zone
along the spectrum, where reference to other factors may be helpful in
discerning the value or not of salutary speech. In this sense, the work of
Carol Pauli and Susan Benesch is particularly enlightening.90 Pauli’s
research uses communications theory postulates, such as the “ritual model,”
“the spiral of silence,” and “the cognitive-transactional model,” to suggest
when the marketplace of ideas may no longer be functioning, i.e., when
salutary speech is of little or no value.91 In the context of distinguishing
between incitement to genocide and the legitimate exercise of free speech,
Benesch has similarly formulated a set of criteria that provides guidance with
respect to the value of salutary speech within an extreme discriminatory

87

Id.
Id.
89
See discussion supra Part III.B (derived from Stanton’s “The 8 Stages of Genocide”).
90
See, e.g., Benesch, supra note 47; Carol Pauli, Killing the Microphone: When Broadcast
Freedom Should Yield to Genocide Prevention, 61 ALA. L. REV. 665 (2010).
91
See Pauli, supra note 90, at 672–73, 679–85.
88
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environment.92 The collective work of Pauli and Benesch suggests the
following criteria as indicating the marginal value of salutary speech in the
early process phase:
(1) MEDIA ENVIRONMENT: Implying the impotence of
salutary speech in a coercive media environment with an
absence of competing messages and frequent message
repetition;
(2) POLITICAL CONTEXT: Indicating the limited value of
salutary speech when political instability, transition or
repression heightens audience dependence on the
communication media and thereby strengthens the
influence of inimical speech on audience members;
(3) AUDIENCE CHARACTERISTICS: Suggesting inimical speech
may be impervious to salutary speech where the audience
is young or unsophisticated, already inclined toward
prejudiced views or highly networked along such lines as
tribal membership and religion;
(4) AUTHORITY OF MESSAGE SOURCE: Where the source of
inimical speech is a person of authority in the eyes of the
audience, salutary speech may be futile;
(5) PRIOR SIMILAR MESSAGES: Implying salutary speech
cannot stand up to inimical speech when the audience has
been receiving the same inimical message repetitively and
on a consistent basis;
(6) CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION: Indicating that the value
of salutary speech is diluted when inimical speech is
disseminated by pervasive channels of communication
such as broadcast and social media;
(7) MESSAGE CONTENT: Where inimical speech consistently
advocates for persecution or violence, salutary speech is
shorn of its remedial effects.93
With respect to the above list, some elaboration is in order regarding
political context and message content. Regarding political context, the

92

See Benesch, supra note 47, at 519–25.
See generally Pauli, supra note 90; Benesch, supra note 47 (providing these criteria
through their respective analyses).
93
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circumstances surrounding instability, transition, and repression can be quite
varied. Certain societies can be transitioning into democracy from
authoritarian and/or human rights violator regimes. But for some that
transition may be less successful than others. Countries such as Brazil,
South Africa, and Indonesia have been cited as examples of successful
transitions.94 Thus, in such countries, perhaps it makes sense to give the
benefit of the doubt to successful operation of the marketplace of ideas.
Other countries, such as Libya, Egypt, and Burma most recently, have
struggled with incipient transitions to democracy and the rapid spread of
inimical speech in those countries should perhaps more readily signify that
the marketplace has shut down.95 Similarly, countries once authoritarian and
then seemingly democratic may be in the process of backsliding. The
Republic of the Maldives, where a democratically elected president took over
in 2008 after thirty years of autocratic rule and then was ousted in a 2012
military coup, may be the perfect example in that regard.96 In such
situations, one should be more willing to reject the viability of the
marketplace in an environment of pervasive inimical speech. As the ousted
president noted with respect to the country’s authoritarian backsliding and
the climate for inimical speech:
At the same time, new laws guaranteeing freedom of speech
were abused by a new force in Maldivian politics: Islamic
extremists. The former president’s cabinet members threw
anti-Semitic and anti-Christian slurs at my government,
branding as apostates anyone who tried to defend the country’s
94
See WILLIAM H. FREDERICK, INDONESIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 305 (2011) (offering that
Indonesia “has successfully navigated a transition to democracy, minimizing the military’s
direct political influence, amending the constitution, holding multiple credible elections, and
embarking on an unprecedented decentralization of power”); EDWARD D. MANSFIELD & JACK
SNYDER, ELECTING TO FIGHT: WHY EMERGING DEMOCRACIES GO TO WAR 8 (2005) (discussing
South Africa and Brazil).
95
See Bruno Phillip, Ethnic Violence Mars Transition for Rohingya in Burma, GUARDIAN,
June 26, 2012, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/26/burma-rohingya-pers
ecution-ethnic-violence (discussing violence arising as Burma has adopted political reforms);
Steven Sotloff, Libya’s Road to Democracy: Expect a Bumpy Road, TIME, Aug. 29, 2011,
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2090994,00.html; The Uncertain
Future of the Arab Spring, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 13, 2011, available at http://articles.baltimores
un.com/2011-10-13/news/bs-ed-egypt-20111013_1_egyptian-army-cairo-s-tahrir-squ are-copticchristians (considering the difficulties in Egypt).
96
See Mohamed Nasheed, The Dregs of Dictatorship, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/opinion/in-the-maldives-strangled-democracy.html?_r=0.
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liberal Islamic traditions and claiming that democracy granted
them and their allies license to call for violent jihad and indulge
in hate speech.97
Message content also deserves additional consideration. Recall that
inimical speech runs along a spectrum of less to more severe with the
following key classifications: (1) general hate speech; (2) harassment; and
(3) incitement.98
In an environment in which inimical speech is
predominantly characterized by general hate speech, all things being equal,
the marketplace of ideas is more likely to be operational.99 This is less likely
to be the case when the speech at issue consists primarily of harassment.100
Finally, when it comes to a speech environment suffused with incitement, it
is hardest to imagine a functional marketplace of ideas.101 Perhaps the
marketplace still works if the incitement is sparse, indirect and focused on
discrimination (as opposed to persecution or violence).102 However, in cases
of widespread incitement to persecution, and especially incitement to
violence, it should be safe to assume the marketplace has shut down and bad
speech presumptively emasculates good.103
2. The Action and Execution Stages
During the action and execution stages (covering Stanton’s
“organization,” “polarization,” “preparation,” “extermination,” “denial”), the
movement toward atrocity has become inexorable and salutary speech no
longer serves a palliative function.104 Segregation, persecution, and violence,
among other serious human rights violations, are now taking place.105 At this
juncture, speech serves the exclusive purpose of attacking the target group,
whether through persecutory or violent means. The goal thus becomes to
stop such speech through legally coercive means.106 So new paradigms for
dealing with speech then emerge: civil action and punishment.
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
See discussion supra Part II.C.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
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a. Civil Action Options
To the extent there are remnants of authority opposed to the atrocity
planning, preparation, or execution, and assuming violence is underway,
these officials can attempt to enjoin the offensive speech.107 Such
injunctions must be narrowly tailored and specifically justified by ongoing or
imminent violence.108 If injunctions are not feasible, civil actions could be
another option. For example, a complaint could be lodged with an antidiscrimination commission empowered to enjoin further dissemination of
inimical speech or order a public apology, retraction, or other remedies,
including fines and educational efforts.109 Finally, perhaps the least
efficacious of non-criminal actions could be a tort lawsuit, which could
include a demand for punitive damages.110
However, it is unlikely sufficient enforcement authority would exist to
realistically pursue such non-criminal remedies. Typically, government
officials planning atrocities—the relevant time period per this Article’s
analysis—monopolize power and are operating pursuant to state policy. As
William Schabas has noted regarding mass atrocity cases before the
international tribunals: “Essentially all prosecutions have involved offenders
acting on behalf of a State and in accordance with a State policy.”111 During
the identification and execution stages, then, there is not likely to be anyone
capable of enforcing prior restraints or civil remedies related to the
dissemination of inimical speech.
b. Criminal Options
As a result, barring sudden regime change, resort to criminal law will
have to be imposed externally. In particular, speech in service of atrocity
planning, preparation, or execution must be prosecuted as instigation, crimes
against humanity (persecution), or direct and public incitement to commit
genocide.
107

See, e.g., Greg Mitchell, Court Upholds Hate Speech Gag, RECORDER (Aug. 3, 1999),
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005511828&slreturn=2013111923205.
108
Id.
109
Gelber, supra note 3, at 202.
110
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C. R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 179–81 (1982) (describing
possible tort remedies and punitive damages for racial insults).
111
William A. Schabas, State Policy as an Element of International Crimes, 98 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 953, 954 (2008).
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i. Instigating, Ordering, Soliciting, and Inducing
Instigating, ordering, soliciting, and inducing are rather straightforward.
They are part of the “individual criminal responsibility” sections of the ICTR
Statute (Art. 6(1))112 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (Art. 25).113 Art. 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, for example, declares:
“1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in
articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the
crime.” Art. 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statute states that “a person shall be
criminally responsible if that person . . . [o]rders, solicits or induces the
commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted.”
To establish this mode of criminal liability, then, the prosecution need
prove that the defendant verbally encouraged or ordered a third party to
commit one of the Statute’s core crimes (i.e., crimes against humanity, war
crimes, or genocide) and the third party then committed the crime. This is to
be distinguished from persecution and incitement, analyzed below, which do
not require resultant violence for liability to attach.
ii. Crimes Against Humanity (Persecution)
Criminal advocacy has long been prosecuted as a crime against humanity.
Beginning with the Nuremberg prosecution of top Nazi leaders, international
law has recognized that inimical speech targeting groups on pernicious
discriminatory grounds may constitute the crime against humanity of
persecution.114 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg convicted
Nazi newspaper publisher Julius Streicher of this offense owing to his

112

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed
in the Territory of Neighboring States, Between 1 Jan. 1994 and 31 Dec. 1994, Annex to S.C.
Res. 955, art. 6(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
113
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
reprinted in 1 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, Official Records (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
114
See London Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (declaring that “persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds” constitute Crimes against Humanity within the IMT’s jurisdiction).
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consistent calls for the extermination of Jews in his newspaper Der
Stürmer.115
The ICTR Statute also classifies persecution as a crime against humanity.
Article 3 declares that persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds,
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
civilian population, constitute crimes against humanity.116 In Prosecutor v.
Ruggiu, in sentencing an RTLM broadcaster who had pled guilty to a
persecution charge, the Tribunal specified the elements of the crime:
(1) those elements required for all crimes against humanity under the Statute;
(2) a gross or blatant denial of a fundamental right reaching the same level of
gravity as the other acts prohibited under Article 3; and (3) discriminatory
grounds.117 The Tribunal then found that Ruggiu’s broadcast satisfied these
elements:
[When] examining the [admitted] acts of persecution . . . it is
possible to discern a common element. Those acts were direct
and public radio broadcasts all aimed at singling out and
attacking the [Tutsi ethnic group] on discriminatory grounds,
by depriving them of the fundamental rights to life, liberty and
basic humanity enjoyed by members of wider society. The
deprivation of these rights can be said to have as its aim the
death and removal of those persons from the society in which
they live alongside the perpetrators, or eventually even from
humanity itself.118

115

See IMT Judgment, Oct. 1, 1946, reprinted in 22 THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT
NUREMBERG GERMANY 501–02 (1946). However, the IMT acquitted Hans Fritzsche, Head of
the Nazi Propaganda Ministry Radio Section, on the same charges for a purported lack of
evidence of clear incitement and an alleged lack of control over formulation of propaganda
policy. Id. at 525–26.
116
ICTR Statute, supra note 112, art. 3.
117
Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgment (June l, 2000), ¶ 21 (citing
Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16, Judgment (January 14, 2000)).
118
Id. ¶ 22. In contrast, a Trial Chamber for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia found in Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 209
(Feb. 26, 2001) that the hate speech alleged in the indictment did not constitute persecution
because it did not rise to the same level of gravity as the other enumerated acts. But see
Gordon, supra note 27, at 303 (taking issue with the ICTY Trial Chamber’s analysis in
Kordic).
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The Nahimana judgment specified that persecution is not a provocation to
cause harm—it is the harm itself.119 Thus, “there need not be a call to action
in communications that constitute persecution [and thus] there need be no
link between persecution and acts of violence.”120
iii. Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide
The other crime that may be charged is direct and public incitement to
commit genocide. In a series of decisions beginning in 1998, the ICTR set
forth the elements of the offense. In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the ICTR found
that speech could be considered “public” if addressed to “a number of
individuals in a public place” or to “members of the general public at large
by such means as the mass media, for example, radio or television.”121
And the message could be deemed “direct” if, when viewing the language
“in the light of its cultural and linguistic content, the persons for whom the
message was intended immediately grasped the implication thereof.”122
Mens rea consists of a dual intent: (1) to provoke another to commit
genocide; and (2) to commit the underlying genocide itself.123
Significantly, causation is not an element—in other words, to establish
liability, it is not necessary for the advocacy to result in genocide.124
The most complex—and controversial—aspect of the crime centers on its
key descriptor: “incitement.” In defining it, the Tribunal has grappled with
distinguishing between free exercise of legitimate speech (regardless of how
offensive) and corrosion of such speech into criminal advocacy. The
Nahimana Trial Chamber explicitly identified two analytic criteria to
119
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 1073 (Dec. 3, 2003),
http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=404468bc2.
120
Id. The International Criminal Court also has Crimes against Humanity (Persecution)
within its subject matter jurisdiction. See Rome Statute, supra note 113, art. 7. The chapeau
of Article 7 of the Rome Statute also consists of a “widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” And then subsection (h) of the
enumerated acts includes: “Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious . . . or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in
this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.” The ICC has yet to decide if
hate speech qualifies as persecution under the Rome Statute.
121
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 556 (Sept. 2, 1998), http://
www.refworld.org/docid/40278fbb4.html.
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Id. ¶¶ 557–558.
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Id. ¶ 560.
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Id. ¶ 553; see also Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, ¶ 1015.
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determine whether discourse could be categorized as either legitimate
expression or criminal advocacy: its purpose (encompassing, on one end of
the continuum, patently legitimate objectives, such as historical research or
dissemination of news, and, on the other end, clearly criminal ends such as
explicit pleas for violence) and its context (circumstances surrounding the
speaker’s text—such as contemporaneous large-scale interethnic violence,
and the speaker’s tone of voice).125
My scholarship has identified two additional criteria implicitly used by
the Nahimana Trial Chamber in formulating its analysis: text and the
relationship between speaker and subject.126 The Trial Chamber’s discussion
of the “text” element was an implicit part of its “purpose” subheading
analysis.
Applying this element involved a parsing and exegetical
interpretation of the key words in the speech.127
With respect to speaker and subject, the Tribunal revealed that the
analysis should be more speech-protective when the speaker is part of a
minority criticizing either the government or the country’s majority
population (and less so in other situations).128
My scholarship has also advocated bifurcating the context criterion into
Internal context refers to
“internal” and “external” components.129
characteristics of the speaker herself: her background and professional
profile, her previous publication/broadcast history, and her personal manner
of transmitting the message (including tone of voice).130 How did this
particular speaker, given her background and manner of expressing herself,
convey the information on this specific occasion?

125
Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T ¶¶ 1000–1006 (discussing purpose of speech); id.
¶¶ 1004–1006 (analyzing a spectrum between legitimate and criminal purposes); id. ¶ 1022
(discussing the context in which the speech occurs). The space between the legitimate and the
criminal ends of the spectrum clearly invites contextual analysis. And the Tribunal has
proposed certain evaluative factors such as surrounding violence and previous rhetoric. See
id. ¶ 1004 (speaking of massacres taking place surrounding the speakers utterance); id. ¶ 1005
(focusing on previous conduct to reveal purpose of text).
126
See Gregory S. Gordon, “A War of Media, Words, Newspapers, and Radio Stations”:
The ICTR Media Trial Verdict and a New Chapter in the International Law of Hate Speech,
45 VA. J. INT’L L. 139, 172 (2004); Gregory S. Gordon, Defining Incitement to Genocide: A
Response to Susan Benesch, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 17, 2008), http://opiniojuris.org/2008/04/17/d
efining-incitement-to-genocide-a-response-to-susan-benesch-2/.
127
Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, ¶ 1001.
128
Id. ¶ 1006.
129
Gordon, supra note 20, at 637.
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Id.
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External context examines the circumstances surrounding the speech,
which could include recent incidents of mass violence or the imminent
outbreak of war (empirically an indicator of a genocidal environment).131
How does the situation during that time and place affect the manner in which
we understand the expression?
FIG. 3 – COMBINING SPEECH AND CHRONOLOGY

3. The Special Case of “Denial”
It should be noted that punishment with respect to the final stage of the
“execution” phase—denial—may be controversial from the perspective of
the most zealous free speech advocates. That depends on its context. Denial
by direct perpetrators or their confederates as the end-phase of a genocidal
cabal must be analyzed as a function of conspiracy law, not in terms of
ordinary hate speech regulation. As Gregory Stanton observes:

131

Id. at 638.
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The perpetrators of genocide dig up the mass graves, burn
the bodies, try to cover up the evidence and intimidate the
witnesses. They deny that they committed any crimes, and
often blame what happened on the victims. They block
investigations of the crimes, and continue to govern until
driven from power by force, when they flee into exile. There
they remain with impunity, like Pol Pot or Idi Amin, unless
they are captured and a tribunal is established to try them.132
On the other hand, once the conspiracy has run its course, denial rhetoric
must be seen in a different light. It is not part of a cover-up. And it is
relatively less likely to cause fresh violence in the short term. Given this
more tenuous connection to the original atrocity, free speech advocates
oppose criminalizing denial.133
And there may be good reasons for that. Many feel that allowing deniers
to spew their falsities exposes their absurdity, provides legitimate historians
with opportunities to remind the populace of what really happened, and thus
only strengthens the hold and sway of truth.134 Moreover, to the extent there
are atrocity-related details or aspects that remain more obscure, denial forces
society to examine those particulars in greater depth and create a more
fulsome and exacting historical record.135 And, from a good governance
perspective, permitting deniers to espouse their beliefs, however bogus,
strengthens society’s sense that its individuals are autonomous and capable
of making important personal choices.136 Finally, giving free rein to deniers
gives society a mirror by which to inspect itself and understand whether, and
to what extent, education may be wanting or extremist groups may be
growing and/or gaining traction.137 Such intelligence is crucial for effective
and efficient governance and policy prioritization.

132

Stanton, supra note 60.
See Russell L. Weaver, Brandenburg and Incitement in a Digital Era, 80 MISS. L.J.
1263, 1288 (2011) (“For example, even though countries like France and Germany prohibit
Holocaust denial, the United States does not (and probably cannot) impose criminal
restrictions on Holocaust denials because of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution’s guarantee of free speech.”).
134
See generally Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, supra
note 23, at 123–38 (pointing out the problems with genocide denial laws).
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
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On the other hand, not all countries are the same. Certain ones have
particular histories that make criminalizing denial much more tenable, if not
essential. Germany, for example, grappling with the heavy weight of the
Nazi genocide of the Jews, had compelling reasons to enact Holocaust-denial
laws.138 And few would quibble when the new government of Rwanda,
taking power after four months of unimaginable Tutsi mass slaughter,
criminalized denial of the 1994 genocide.139 The directly culpable and
traumatized genocide forum country has a special and historic interest in
outlawing related mendacity.140
Even the fiercest defenders of free expression voice sympathy for such
laws in such post-conflict societies.141 But they draw the line there. First
Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams, for example, frowns on Holocaust
denial laws for countries such as the United States and Canada, which are not
the loci of the underlying massacres.142 However, both of these countries
have significant victim populations and anti-denial laws may be justified to
safeguard the interests of those victims. As Katharine Gelber notes:
[In] the act of denying this historical truth [of the Holocaust],
the deniers denigrate the Jewish people and memories of
historical occurrences, suggest that those who accept the truth
of the Holocaust lie, and relativize the suffering incurred.
Thus, the act of Holocaust denial is not simply an expression of
belief in what did or did not happen historically, given that the
Holocaust has been historically verified. It is an act of
vilification that denigrates and harms.143
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See Gordon Butler, The Essence of Human Rights: A Religious Critique, 43 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1255, 1300–01 (2009) (noting that Holocaust denial in Germany threatens democratic
stability while that may not be the case in the United States).
139
See Jennifer M. Allen & George H. Norris, Is Genocide Different? Dealing with Hate
Speech in a Post-Genocide Society, 7 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 146, 172 (2011) (“Given the
short passage of time and the existence of militant groups that deny the genocide, a statute
specifically outlawing genocide denial, similar to those found in Germany, Israel, and the EU,
would be an important tool to help Rwanda overcome the racist attitudes that have fueled its
violent past.”). However, as discussed infra, one may wonder whether, over time, such denial
laws might outlive their original justification. Id.
140
Id.
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See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, On American Hate Speech Law, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT
OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATIONS AND RESPONSES, supra note 3, at 116, 118.
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Id. at 125.
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Gelber, supra note 3, at 210–11.
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Still, notwithstanding these considerations, in criminalizing denial other
problematic issues remain. For example, while denial laws might make
sense in the immediate aftermath of mass killing, while survivors are still
with us, does a time come when, in light of the other considerations
discussed herein, they outlive their utility?144 Should they eventually be
phased out? Also, assuming such laws are on balance still beneficial, are
they being effectively enforced? Inadequate or inefficacious enforcement
could tip the balance in favor of abolishing such laws or not enacting them in
the first place.
Then again, if the absence of criminalization allows denial to flourish at
some point in the more distant future, then a genocidal campaign might
eventually have the impetus to regenerate itself. Gregory Stanton writes that
denial “is among the surest indicators of future genocidal massacres.” And
even if insufficient on its own, denial can often be used with other more
direct techniques of incitement to create a potent cocktail very likely to stir
violence. So definitive answers about the best way to deal with it are elusive
indeed.
V. CONCLUSION
Curbing or preventing verbal and/or physical expressions of animus
toward target groups is a multi-faceted enterprise. Speech, which has been
the focus of this Article, is only part of it. Still, speech plays an extremely
significant role along the problem’s entire spectrum. Speech manages to
insinuate itself at every stage, i.e., in conceiving, stoking, reifying, exposing,
impeding, dissipating, and, in best case scenarios, ultimately extinguishing
hatred. This Article has taken the position that, in most cases, the remedial
powers of salutary speech are more than equal to the task of combatting
inimical speech. In other words, more speech is the cure for prior speech’s
ills. A well-informed, self-actualized, politically engaged, and autonomous
citizenry, both vigilant and vibrant as it confronts and filters out noxious
expression, is the ideal.
But, as the analysis of denial demonstrated, certain societies have special
victim groups and historical circumstances. Jeremy Waldron makes a
compelling argument that inclusiveness and dignity are social goods, like
clean air and water, on which everyone relies, including members of victim
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See Allen & Norris, supra note 139, at 172.
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groups.145 Hate speech, he contends, compromises if not eradicates these
public goods and so, like businesses that consciously place poisonous
products in the stream of commerce, its purveyors should be criminally
prosecuted.146 This does seem like a sweeping statement. But might it be
true in certain societies under certain circumstances? And in all societies
teetering on the brink of atrocity, in that twilight zone between pre-process
and process, should laws be in place to supplement salutary speech in
combatting inimical speech? It is beyond the scope of this Article to resolve
those issues. What is certain, however, is that at some point the power of
salutary speech to cure the ills of inimical speech will fail. In the later stages
of the atrocity process, punishment, most likely externally imposed, must be
the remedy.
Racial and ethnic prejudice, invidious discrimination, extremist group
formation, a culture of impunity—these are inter-related problems and often
successive steps along the same continuum. If left unchecked, that
continuum leads to atrocity. Speech can serve as an important check with
respect to each step on the continuum. But it can help effectuate and
reinforce each step too. Keeping in mind the policy considerations
elucidated in this Article, governments can exploit and regulate speech to
strike a balance between atrocity prevention and respect for civil liberties.
The latter need never be incompatible with the former.
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